'Surprise' is the automatic reaction to a mismatch. It is:
High level predictions have many different sources: from analogy ("The first time he was very elegant, I think that he will be well dressed") and, in general, inferences and reasoning ("He is Italian thus he will love pasta"), to natural laws, and -in social domainto norms, roles, conventions, habits, scripts ("He will not do so; here it is prohibited"), or to "Theory of Mind" ("He hate John, so he will try to…"; "He decided to go in vacation, so he will not be here on Monday").
Some model claims that Surprise is function of unexpectedeness (Macedo & Cardoso 2001) , other models claims that Surprise is function of the distance between prior probabilities and posterior probalities obtained after conditioning on a set of perceived data (Itti & Baldi 2004 , 2005 Baldi 2004 ). We believe that both views are correct but incomplete and complementary. The degree of mismatch and the strenght of expectation or its subjective probability should be integrated in a complex way taking into account the subjective correlation between the perceived features. Moreover, the Surprise as a function of the distance between priors and posteriore should be modelled separately from Surprise generated by the simple mismatch (Emiliano would you like to add something on this?).
LEVELS OF SURPRISE
There are at least 3 layers of Surprise in highly cognitive systems. Each layer of Surprise can be associated with a specific kind of test. i) Peripheral Test: an Active Test between prediction and event (attempt to confirm). ii) Intermediate Test: a later test between passive expectations and the incoming data. iii) Internal Test: a test about the plausibility of the candidate belief in relation with my integrated belief system (attempt to integrate).
In the following section I describe the three layers (and the associated tests) i) Firsthand Surprise, or Surprise in Perception/Sensing or Active-Prediction-based Surprise, or Mismatch-based Surprise I'm actively checking whether P or not P but with the forecast that P, that is, I have an endogenous anticipatory representation of the incoming input and I attempt to match the stimulus against it. If there is a mismatch between the two (sensory) representations there is surprise:
The more sure I was about the more surprised I am
Intensity of Surprise = Function (Bel%)
Moreover, if I was also concerned (as usually is for leaving systems) that is if there was not just a forecast but an "expectation" then I will be more surprised, meaning that my response/reaction will be more intense. My concern affects the surprise which is not only an "epistemic" reaction
The more important the Goal the more Surprise I will be Of course, there will be also specific and richer affective reactions, like Disappointment or Relief, (Confirmation or Exultance??). Also their intensity is function of the degree of certainty and the value of the goal ii) Surprise in Perception/??Apperception?/Recognition? or Passive Predictionbased Surprise
Passive expectation: I have formulated an explicit prediction but it is not actively used for testing the event, I'm not checking whether, exploring. The information simply arrives (I was not specifically searching for it) but its consistency should be tested in anyway, first of all with anticipatory representation in the background, off attention. Attention is moved on this discrepancy. Intensity laws look similar to the previous ones.
There is a different case, where the incoming data is tested not against explicit but nonactively tested expectations, but against implicit, potential ones. But we believe that case is not distinghuishable from the next one.
In both cases there is this additional principle: Incredulity comes later from the deep control, the attempt to integrate with previous knowledge, not from a mismatch; and not necessarily is preceded by a mismatch-surprise.
Prediction: The more "incredible" the more "surprising"
Incredible means that from my previous integrated-coherent believed beliefs I would derive (Not P) the opposite of the candidate belief that P. The stronger the inferred opponent (Bel% Not P) the more incredible P for me, and thus the more surprising.
The former principles: Given the 'belief' about a future event P (Prediction), when P really happens we can have 3 different cases:
1. P & prediction that P ==> No surprise 2. P & Non prediction that P (& Non prediction that Not P) ==> weak surprise ???????? 3. P & prediction that Not P ==> strong surprise now are principles of "plausibility": in the first case P is higly plausible (not just compatible but predictable) in the second case is not implausible, compatible (weak plausibility) in the third is highly implausible, incompatible, it creates a contradiction.
In sum, there are at least two surprises: one in perceiving/recognizing, the other in believing! And some form in-between.
WHAT IS SURPRISE FOR?
The felt feedback of surprise, feeling surprise seems to play several functions.
It is not only related to redirecting attention on the mismatching facts, concentrating cognitive processing resources on them, trying to better interpreting it etc. (epistemic reaction). This is only the main part of the immediate response and short-term function. Another one is activating resources for possible practical (non-epistemic) activity; physical arousal, bodily preparation for fast reaction. There are also long term effects (and functions) of the perceived surprise for a bad prediction; for example: -revising that prediction, reducing its strength (a learning feedback); -becoming more cautious next time in the same circumstances; less confident; increasing controls before and during the actions; -reducing self-confidence as predictor; acquire more evidences, be careful in reasoning, etc. Others??
